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Comment on Hoerger: Early Pilots of 
Medicare Auctions Brings No Solace 
to Auction Experts
PETEr CrAMToN ANd BrETT E. KATzMAN
Dear Editors,
Our Economists’ Voice column sum-marized the severe problems with 
the current and proposed Medicare auc-
tions. The column was based on a careful 
reading and analysis of the auction rules. 
Since that time we and other auction ex-
perts have studied the Medicare auctions 
with theory, experiment, and the limited 
amount of field data that the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
has made available. This substantial body 
of evidence is available at www.cramton.
umd.edu/papers/health-care. The evidence 
strongly supports our preliminary analysis 
that the auction program is fatally flawed 
and must be fixed.
Dr. Hoerger suggests that we should find 
comfort in his evaluations of early pilots that 
showed that prices were reduced with little 
impact on access and quality. Very little can 
be learned from the pilots. They were essen-
tially a one-sided test. Failure would have 
been telling but success means little. The 
administrative Medicare prices were gener-
ally high and therefore the price reductions 
found in early pilots were easily absorbed 
by suppliers. Hoerger’s evaluation supports 
this widely held view. Whatever success the 
pilots had has little bearing on the long-term 
efficiency and stability of the current auc-
tion design. The true measure of the auc-
tion rests on whether it leads to sustainable, 
least-cost prices going forward, without cre-
ating any shortages. It will not. 
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Imagine that a bridge builder is caught 
using faulty cement to build a train trestle 
and that bridge building experts all agree 
that the bridge will collapse under a “heavy 
load.” Would the experts accept that every-
thing is right simply because the builder 
points out that the bridge is still standing? 
Or would they rely on their knowledge of 
structural engineering and immediately 
repair the bridge before a catastrophic 
event occurred? 
Auction design is really no different than 
bridge design. It is an established science 
offering a wealth of knowledge and experi-
ence that should be accessed in the formula-
tion, implementation, and evaluation of new 
auction markets. Hoerger speculates that the 
167 auction experts would be less pessimis-
tic about the Medicare auctions if they only 
knew about his pilot evaluations. We believe 
that this is as likely as the bridge experts 
ignoring the laws of physics and waiting for 
the train wreck.
The California electricity crisis of 2000-
2001 provides a vivid example of how 
improperly designed auctions can appear 
successful, but ultimately fail. That new 
auction-based market was introduced in 
1998 and operated without incident for 
two years. Then in the summer of 2000 the 
“heavy load” of water shortages and other 
factors arrived. The market spiraled to cata-
strophic failure, ultimately costing Califor-
nians about $40 billion and extended peri-
ods of rolling blackouts. The problem was 
that the market suffered from severe design 
flaws that have since been fixed. However, 
the early “success” of the market was irrel-
evant to the market’s eventual failure in 
2000-2001.
There is no debate among experts about 
the flaws in the Medicare auctions. All 
experts agree that the program is a train 
wreck waiting to happen. Non-binding bids 
and the median pricing rule lead to low-ball 
bids that ultimately will bias prices down-
ward until they are unsustainable. How long 
this will take will vary by product and region, 
and secretive CMS decisions. For now, the 
catastrophe is being avoided as CMS uses 
various tactics to mask the inevitable in pilot 
markets around the United States. 
The current auction rules and lack of 
transparency give CMS almost complete 
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prices without quantity manipulation. The 
nearly full-scale mock auction achieved effi-
ciencies of 97 percent, consistent with the 
experimental results. The CMS auction rules 
result in complete market failure in theory 
and efficiencies well below 50 percent in the 
lab. There is no debate about whether the 
CMS auction rules need to change.
Peter Cramton 
University of Maryland
Brett E. Katzman 
Kennesaw State University
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